This paper examines the effects of Georgia's merit-based HOPE Scholarship on college enrollments. Until the late 1980s, only a small fraction of total student aid was allocated on the basis of merit, but in the last decade state governments have stepped in, distributing billions of dollars in "HOPE-style" merit aid. Introduced in 1993, the HOPE Scholarship covers tuition, fees, and book expenses for students attending Georgia public colleges, and provides a subsidy of comparable value to students attending in-state private colleges, without any income restrictions. Treating HOPE as a natural experiment, we contrast enrollment rates in Georgia with those in the other member states of the Southern Regional Educational Board using IPEDS data for the period 1988-97. We estimate that the scholarship increased the overall freshmen enrollment rate by 6.9 percentage points, with the gains concentrated in 4-year schools. We also find that HOPE raised the enrollment rates of both blacks and whites in Georgia schools, with the state's historically-black institutions playing an important role. Finally, our results suggest that total HOPE-induced increase represents about 12 percent of high-school graduates who qualified for the scholarship and 21 percent of those who took the award. However, because the overall HOPE effect involves enrollees at 2-year schools who are more likely recipients of the non-merit-based HOPE Grant, the total program enrollment response amounts to less than 10 percent of all freshmen program beneficiaries.
Introduction
Student financial aid programs have traditionally been need-based with two primary goals.
One has been to promote greater access to higher education by targeting individuals who face credit constraints that would otherwise prevent them from attending college. The other has been to expand college choice by enlarging the set of affordable institutions.
Until the late 1980s, only a small fraction of total student aid was allocated on the basis of merit, and essentially all of it related to individual institutions' attempts to attract academically proficient students. However, in the last decade state governments have stepped in, distributing billions of dollars in financial aid through a range of newly established, meritbased college scholarships, most of which have no means tests. A common justification for these actions is similar to that for institution-specific merit aid-to induce the best highschool students to remain in state for their college educations. Invariably, the model for these programs is Georgia's "Helping Outstanding Pupils Educationally" (HOPE) Scholarship.
Initiated in 1993 and funded by a state lottery, the HOPE Scholarship covers tuition, fees and book expenses for all eligible high-school graduates attending Georgia public postsecondary institutions. Eligible students who attend in-state private institutions receive a fixed payment comparable to the value of the subsidy received by public-school enrollees.
To qualify for the scholarship at one of Georgia's degree-granting public or private colleges, a high-school student must graduate with a "B" average. There are no income restrictions.
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Along with the scholarship, Georgia instituted the HOPE Grant, which has no income restrictions or merit requirements, but can be applied only to non-degree programs at 2-year schools. From September 1993 through November 2002, more than $1.7 billion in program funds have been disbursed to over 650,000 students. With students from middle and upperincome households eligible for HOPE, it is not surprising that the program enjoys widespread support. The popular appeal of HOPE has led fifteen other states, including all of Georgia's neighbors to set up merit-based scholarships of their own, usually with lottery funding like for by a decrease in residents leaving the state. Interestingly, however, the data also suggest that recent freshmen comprised less than half of the overall 4-year-school enrollment rise.
Thus, the greater enrollment response occurred among freshmen who delayed matriculation past twelve months. For these students, we speculate that the decrease in the 4-year-2-year relative price was more important. To the extent that the overall 4-year-school enrollment increases came from students who would have otherwise attended 2-year schools, the small and insignificant 2-year coefficient estimate implies that their vacated seats were filled by individuals on the labor-market margin receiving the non-merit-based HOPE Grant.
The race-specific results generally replicate the pattern we see for all first-time freshmen, with the scholarship's influence concentrated in 4-year schools. However, the greater percentage changes in black enrollment rates occur in public institutions-27 at 4-year publics versus 14 percent at 4-year private colleges. The difference is partly explained by the fact that blacks have much lower enrollment rates to begin with, and therefore, a relatively small increase in enrollment rates can account for a large percentage change. In addition, Georgia is home to a number of historically black colleges and universities (HBCUs), which provide an added incentive for African Americans to attend an in-state 4-year college. Consistent with this incentive, we find a substantial program effect on HBCU enrollments.
The only other study to investigate the role of Georgia's HOPE Scholarship on college enrollments is Dynarski (2000) . Using data from the 1989-97 October Current Population Surveys (CPS), for states in the South Atlantic and East South Central Census Divisions, she estimated difference-in-differences regressions of HOPE's effect on college attendance among 18-19-year-olds. 3 Dynarski concluded that HOPE raised college-attendance rates of 18-19-year-olds roughly 25 percent, on par with the effect of Pell on low-income households in the early years of the program.
Our analysis is distinguished Dynarski's by its focus on institutions. The CPS data permit the estimation of HOPE's effect on the likelihood an 18-19-year-old Georgia resident will attend any college, but they do not identify the type of institution or the state where the college is located. However, as outlined above, the IPEDS data allow us to estimate the overall effect of HOPE on enrollments in Georgia colleges and decompose it by institution type. The IPEDS data also track, at least for recent freshmen, the states in which they attend college. As it turns out, these data provide no evidence that HOPE increased the number of Georgia-resident freshmen in 4-year colleges. Still, it is difficult to reconcile the two studies, because recent freshmen are only 80 percent of all freshmen and the residency and migration data are available for just four years of our sample period.
Georgia's HOPE Scholarship
Georgia's HOPE Scholarship is the largest state-financed, merit-based aid program in the US. As noted above, with the start of the 2002-03 academic year, the amount of scholarship funds disbursed eclipsed $1.7 billion and the number of recipients exceeded 650,000. By 1997, total non-need-based aid awarded by Georgia was greater than that of the other 14 SREB states combined. 4 By 1999, HOPE had grown to roughly double the size and scope of the federal Pell Grant program in Georgia.
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The original goals of the scholarship were to ensure that Georgia's best high-school graduates could afford college and provide them a greater incentive to attend in state. Former governor Zell Miller, the architect of Georgia's HOPE program, described the program this way: "This is not about family income. It's saying to a kid and student that if you are responsible and you keep a B average, you will have the opportunity to go to college."
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HOPE awards can be used at 103 institutions in Georgia, of which twenty are public 4-year, thirty are private 4-year, fifteen are public 2-year, five are private 2-year and thirty-three are technical schools. 4 See the National Assocation of State Scholarship and Grant Aid Programs 19th Annual Survey Report, Academic Year 1987-88 and 29th Annual Survey Report, Academic Year 1997-98 . Georgia's total 1998 aid is 55 percent higher than that of the second-ranked state, Florida.
5 In 1998-99, over $189 million in scholarship funds were awarded to 141,000 Georgia undergraduates, compared with only $113 million in Pell aid to 62,000 recipients. 6 Zell Miller, State of the State Address, 1993.
Program Rules and Awards
There are two separate components of the HOPE program, the merit-based scholarship and the HOPE Grant. Eligibility for the former depends on a student's high-school grade-point average, while the latter applies only to non-degree programs at 2-year and "less-than-2-year" schools and has no merit requirements. (The distinction between 2-year and less-than-2-year schools is spelled out in the appendix.) Thus, enrollments at institutions that primarily offer diplomas and certificates will be generally unaffected by the scholarship.
To qualify for the scholarship, an entering freshman must have graduated from an eligible Georgia high school since 1993 with at least a "B" (3.0 grade-point) average and be a Georgia resident. 7 For HOPE Scholars in degree-granting public institutions, the program covers tuition, HOPE-approved mandatory fees and a book allowance. However, until Fall 2000, HOPE-eligibles who also qualified for a Pell Grant would have their Pell aid reduced dollar for dollar by their merit awards. Thus, during our sample period the scholarship provided no added incentive for low-income students to attend college. The value of the award is about $3600 for the 2002-03 academic year. HOPE Scholars in private, degree-granting institutions receive a standard award of $3000 per academic year toward tuition. 8 To retain their scholarships, students must maintain a 3.0 grade-point average while in college.
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In contrast, the HOPE Grant is essentially an entitlement. Eligibility does not depend on high-school grade-point average and there are no restrictions based on when a student graduated from high school. Even students who graduated before 1993 are eligible as long 7 To reduce the number of HOPE Scholars and avoid future funding shortages, the eligibility rules were tightened for students who graduated high school in 2000 to demand a "B" average in "core-curriculum" subjects. Interestingly, the predicted 35 percent drop in HOPE qualifiers did not materialize. The number of HOPE recipients declined only 4.3 percent from the previous year, raising the question of whether grades were inflated in reaction to the stiffer requirements ("Hope Suffers Funding Shortage," Athens Banner Herald , 30 Sep 2000). 8 Its value was initially set at $500 in 1993 and rose to $1000 in 1994 and $1500 in 1995, but the private-school award was not tied to merit during these years. These awards supplemented a $1000 Tuition Equalization Grant (TEG) Georgia provided students attending in-state private schools. Beginning in 1996, the HOPE payment to students attending in-state private schools was increased to $3000 and the merit rules for eligibility were imposed. 9 Cornwell, Lee and Mustard (2003) examine how the retention rules affect the academic choices of students in college. They find that HOPE induces students, especially in their first year, to enroll in fewer classes, withdraw from class more often and shift more of their classes to the summer term.
as they meet the Georgia residency requirements. The grant covers tuition and HOPEapproved mandatory fees, and students may receive it for all coursework required by the institution for a program of study leading to a certificate or diploma. Moreover a student may receive the HOPE Grant for more than one diploma or certificate program. Continued support under the grant is contingent on the satisfactory academic performance of students, which is determined by the individual institution. 
Relative Price Effects and Enrollment Margins
The relative price changes induced by the HOPE Scholarship establish four distinct enrollmentdecision margins: in-state-out-of-state, 2-year-4-year, labor-market-2-year and labor-market-4-year. The most obvious is the in-state-out-of-state margin, since the scholarship lowers the price of in-state relative to out-of-state colleges. The response to this change should 10 These data were provided by special request of the Georgia Student Finance Commission. With the number of HOPE Scholars now at about 650,000, more than 295,000 have been added since Fall 1999.
be observed almost exclusively at 4-year schools, because 4-year students are eight times more likely to attend college out-of-state (Dynarski (2000) ). However, the scholarship could influence the flow of Georgia residents along this margin in both directions. With the most academically proficient encouraged to stay in Georgia, entrance requirements have risen at the state's top universities. This is particularly true of the state's "flagship" schools, the University of Georgia and Georgia Tech. Some students denied admission at these universities may choose an out-of-state alternative that is viewed as a closer substitute in terms of academic offerings, extra-curricular opportunities and regional prominence than Georgia's other state institutions. A recent Georgia high-school graduate who was denied admission to the University of Georgia with an 1150 SAT score and a high-school grade-point average of 3.4, put it this way: "As a result of the HOPE Scholarship, above-average-but-not-quiteoutstanding students are handing over the dough to schools like Auburn, Tennessee, Clemson, Alabama, Ole Miss and other large universities throughout the South."
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Because tuition is higher at 4-year colleges, HOPE also reduces their prices relative to those of 2-year schools. In addition, Kane and Rouse (1995) observe that students deciding whether to attend a 2-year or 4-year college face similar wage differentials, and that their opportunity costs of college enrollment are similar. Therefore, some HOPE-eligible students who would have otherwise enrolled in a 2-year or less-than-2-year college may be motivated to pursue a 4-year degree instead. However, as with the interstate margin, movement between 2-year and 4-year schools could occur in both directions for essentially the same reason. Rising academic standards at the best schools may drive some out-of-state, but might induce others to start their postsecondary schooling at a 2-year institution.
Finally, the data do not distinguish degree from diploma and certificate-seekers in 2-year institutions, conflating the roles of the scholarship and the grant in the estimated overall and 2-year-school program effects. However, the data do identify those less-than-2-year schools that only offer certificates and diplomas, which enroll the majority of all grant recipients. Therefore, we estimate the 2-year-school program effect with and without these institutions in the sample as a gauge of the grant's influence.
Empirical Strategy

Empirical Model
To estimate the enrollment response to HOPE, we contrast enrollment rates in Georgia before and after the HOPE "treatment" with those in sets of similar states serving as control groups.
In a regression context, this means our focus is on the coefficient of an interaction between a HOPE dummy variable and a Georgia state dummy, δ, in an expression like
where E it is state i's (i = 1, . . . , N ) enrollment rate in year t (t = 1, . . . , T ), Y t is a dummy variable for year t, S i is a dummy variable for control state i, H t is a HOPE indicator, equal to 1 when t ≥ 1993 and 0 otherwise, S GA is a dummy variable for Georgia and it is a random error. The ordinary least squares estimator of δ in (1) reflects the difference in differences (DD) between E it in Georgia and the control-group states over the pre-and post-HOPE
periods.
12 This case serves as a baseline in our empirics.
We then determine the robustness of the baselineδ to the inclusion of covariates accounting for state-level differences in income and the opportunity cost of attending college.
Augmented in this way, the empirical model becomes
where X it contains the income and opportunity cost variables.
Another concern is raised by Card and Lemieux (2000) , who find that enrollment rates are lower where population growth is high. This could be empirically important for us, 
Data
We utilize two primary control groups: the other fourteen member states of the SREB and the subset of these fourteen that border Georgia. Given the SREB's coordinated regional focus on education 14 and the absence of any significant HOPE-style interventions among the other members during the sample period, this group constitutes an obvious control group.
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To ensure their suitability as controls, we removed Georgia from the sample and estimated The data to estimate equations (1) and (2) come primarily from the 1988-97 IPEDS surveys conducted by the NCES (see the Appendix for details). We calculate E it as the the ratio of first-time freshmen to the eligible population, which we usually take to be current 13 We are grateful to one of the referees for pointing this out to us. 14 See http://www.sreb.org. 15 Arkansas's Academic Challenge Scholarship was introduced prior to HOPE in 1991, but its benefits are limited to $2500 per year and to households with incomes less than $50,000, while maintaining similar eligibility requirements. Consequently, the number of awardees during our sample period was relatively small. More important in terms of its size is Florida's Bright Futures Scholarship, which was modelled directly after HOPE and initiated in last year of our sample. However, excluding excluding these states from the analysis has virtually no impact on our findings.
high-school graduates. Both full and part-time students are lumped together in the category "first-time freshmen". We include part-time students attending public institutions because they can receive HOPE. Data on public and private high-school graduates were obtained from the SREB.
Figures 2-5 plot the total, 4-year public, 4-year private, and 2-year, public-school, enrollment rate series for Georgia, the SREB and Georgia's border states. The calculated enrollment rates in these figures are high, because not all first-time freshmen are current high-school graduates; some delay matriculation beyond the year following graduation from high school. Enrollment rates based on "recent freshmen"-those who enter college within twelve months of graduation-are smaller, since these students account for only 65 percent of all freshmen in Georgia during our sample period. However, as noted above, eligibility for HOPE extends to anyone who meets the merit requirements and has graduated from high school since 1993, so focusing on exclusively on recent freshmen would potentially understate the program effect. The sharpest contrasts, masked to some degree in the total enrollments series, appear in 4-year public and private college enrollments. In these two cases, Georgia's enrollment rates are relatively higher after 1993.
The NCES has reported recent high-school-graduate data separately for whites and blacks only since 1992 and only for public high schools, so disaggregating the institution-specific enrollment rates by race requires that we adopt a different measure of the college-eligible population. We use 18-19-year-olds, obtaining data on their numbers by race in each SREB state from the US Census Bureau. The overall estimated program effect is robust to this change in the population of college-eligibles.
Our income variable is the per capita personal income measure provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. We measure the opportunity cost of attending college in terms of average weekly manufacturing wages, as computed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics for their Current Employment Statistics. Finally, the average undergraduate tuition paid by in-state undergraduate students, for each institution type, was obtained from the Digest of Education Statistics at the NCES. Each of these variables is expressed in terms of constant Table 2 provides the means and standard deviations of all of the variables in the sample, separately for Georgia and the other SREB states, over the pre-and post-HOPE periods.
To preview the empirical results, notice that the DD in the overall enrollment rate is about .085.
Results
Total Enrollments
We begin our analysis by examining the effect of the HOPE Scholarship on total college enrollments in Georgia. Table 3 reports the estimates of δ obtained from (1) and (2), using both the SREB and border states as controls. In the SREB case, the baselineδ is .082 with a t-ratio of almost 7.5 (see column (1)), which translates into a HOPE-induced enrollment rate rise of 8.2 percentage points. Controlling for per capita income, average weekly manufacturing wages reduces the estimated HOPE effect by more than a percentage point to .069 (column (2)).
16 When the control group is restricted to the border states, we find an estimated HOPE effect of 6.7-6.9 percentage points. Since the mean of E it during the pre-HOPE period is .76, these estimates of δ imply that the overall first-time freshmen enrollment rate was about 8.8-10.7 percent higher in Georgia during the HOPE period because of the program.
One potential problem with this analysis is that it ignores the possibility that enrollment may not move in one-to-one fashion with changes in the eligible population (Card and Lemieux (2000)). Such changes, if they are correlated with the introduction of HOPE, could
show up in the estimated policy effect. This is not an issue for the population of high-school graduates; the DD between Georgia and the other SREB states is small and statistically insignificant. However, for the population of 18-19-year-olds, however, the Georgia-SREB DD is statistically significant.
17 Therefore, we re-estimate equation (2), first adding the 18-19-year-old population to the covariates and then substituting enrollment levels for E it .
The results, reported in Table 4 , suggest that changes in the number of 18-19-year-olds matter little for the overall effect. Controlling for the number of 18-19-year-olds raisesδ slightly to .071. The levels regression produces an estimated HOPE effect of 4091 students, which is close to 4347, the increase implied by aδ of .069.
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Finally, an enrollment effect of 4091 students per year between 1993 and 1997 represents only 12 percent of high-school graduates who qualified for the scholarship during the period and 21 percent of freshmen who took the award. However, the overall program response involves enrollees at 2-year schools, who are more likely to be grant recipients, as indicated in Table 1 . During these five years, about 230,000 students received the HOPE Grant. It is difficult to know how many of these individuals to count as freshmen, because the distinction is not made for diploma and certificate seekers. Assuming that half of this total are (which is probably an understatement since some certificates can be earned in one year), then the HOPE-induced enrollment increase amounts to less than 10 percent of all first-year program beneficiaries.
Other Margins of Adjustment
While our focus is on college enrollments, the program effect we estimate could be influenced by institutional adjustments along other margins. One possibility is that Georgia colleges responded to HOPE by adjusting their in-state shares of admitted students. The information collected by the NCES on student residence and migration patterns suggest otherwise. For the four years during our sample period these data are available-1988, 1992, 1994 and 1996-we calculate the resident shares of all first-time freshmen in all Georgia schools to be .80, .84, .85 and .82. The Georgia Board of Regents provides an annual accounting of 17 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
18 During the HOPE period, the number of recent high-school graduates averaged about 63,000; .069 × 63, 000 = 4347. public-college enrollments by residency, and there was very little variation between 1988 and 1997. In the five years prior to HOPE, the mean in-state share was .897; after 1993, it was slightly higher at .903 (Bugler, Henry and Rubenstein (1999) ).
Another potential margin of adjustment for Georgia institutions is raising tuition, as would be predicted by the Bennett Hypothesis. We test for such behavior by estimating DD regressions of 4-year public, 4-year private and 2-year public tuition prices. We would expect endogenous tuition hikes to be less likely at Georgia's public colleges, because their tuition is set centrally by the state's Board of Regents. Further, the nature of HOPE's funding acts as an additional constraint, since tuition increases translate into larger claims on lottery revenues. At the same time, the opportunity is smaller at private schools since HOPE recipients (Georgia residents) comprise a smaller fraction of their student bodies.
The results, reported in Table 5 , provide no support for the Bennett Hypothesis. In fact, for public institutions, the data show that Georgia tuition prices were lower during the HOPE period-by an average of about $300 at 4-year and $150 at 2-year schools. These findings seem to confirm the importance of the constraints noted above. The DD coefficient estimate for 4-year, private schools is positive, but small-less than $20-and not statistically significant. Controlling for income and wages only reduces in absolute value these estimated effects.
Enrollments by Institution Type
Having established the general magnitude of the overall enrollment effect and considered other margins for institutional responses, we now decompose it by college type, repeating the analysis represented in the first two columns of Table 3 . This is important because the program's influence on relative prices depends on whether the school is 4-year, 2-year or less-than-2-year, public or private. Further, certificate and diploma seekers in 2-year and less-than-2-year schools are not affected by the merit-based scholarship at all, since the grant covers the costs associated with their programs.
4-Year Public Colleges
The results for 4-year public colleges and universities, given in columns (3) and (4) of Table 3 , show that the overall enrollment effect has been realized to a large degree at these institutions. The basic specification produces an estimate of 3.8 percentage points with a t-ratio greater than 6. In this case, controlling for income and opportunity costs has little effect onδ, increasing it by only a tenth of a percentage point. Thus, about 55 percent of the enrollment rate gain attributable to HOPE can be assigned to 4-year publics. Since the mean pre-HOPE enrollment rate is .32, these findings imply that college attendance rate at such institutions have risen 12 percent because of the scholarship.
For total enrollments, the program effect estimates were of generally the same magnitude regardless of the control group. This pattern does not hold for 4-year public-school enrollment rates. The estimates of δ obtained using from the border-state controls are about 1.7
percentage points less than those based on the SREB members, but still statistically significant at the 5-percent level. One explanation for the smallerδs in the border-state case is the rising entrance requirements at the state's "flagship" universities, the University of Georgia and Georgia Tech, over the HOPE period. During most of the 1980s, Barron's Profiles of American Colleges rated the University of Georgia's admissions selectivity as merely "competitive," the fourth highest of six categories. By 1997, its selectivity rating had climbed to "highly competitive," the second highest category. Georgia Tech held a rating at least this high even before our sample period began. Georgia residents denied admission at these schools, and who desire the experience of a big public university, may be induced to leave the state. The University of Tennessee is an example of a traditional out-of-state substitute for the University of Georgia and Georgia Tech that is now considerably less selective and whose Georgia-resident share of freshmen enrollments has risen since HOPE began (see Table 6 ).
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Another contributing factor could be strategic responses by nearby institutions that have historically relied on Georgia residents to fill their entering classes.
4-Year Private Colleges
Columns (5) and (6) of Table 3 present the estimated HOPE effects for 4-year private schools. The experience of these institutions is broadly similar to that of the 4-year publics.
Comparing college attendance rates in Georgia's private schools with those in the SREB, we find policy effects of 3.1 (baseline) and 2.8 (with covariates) percentage points, both highly statistically significant. Given an average pre-HOPE enrollment rate of .143, these results imply increases of 20-22 percent that can be attributed to the scholarship.
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This seems large when we think of private-school tuition prices often exceeding $30,000.
However, as recently as 2000-01, Emory University was the only one of the thirty private 4-year colleges in the state whose tuition exceeded $24,000. The cost of the median private school was about $14,000, and the least expensive about $7000. Thus, for schools in the bottom half of the tuition distribution, the scholarship accounts for a significant portion of the cost of attending. In addition, a number of private schools, like the for-profit DeVry Institute of Technology, cater to part-timers. Eliminating part-time students from the sample, reduces the estimated HOPE effect to 2.2 percentage points, which translates into a 16.5 percent increase in the enrollment rate of full-timers in private colleges. It is also likely that applications to many private schools in Georgia rose as a result of the increasing selectivity of the flagship universities during the HOPE period.
The estimated enrollment rate gains for private colleges are less affected by changes in the control group than those of 4-year public schools. Using the border-state controls diminishes the HOPE effect estimates, but not by as much.
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20 The magnitude of this enrollment rate change is reflected in a higher private-college share of Georgia's enrollments during the HOPE period. DD regressions of the fraction of total enrollments accounted for by each institution type indicate that private-college share rose by a statistically significant 1.7 percentage points. The estimated effects on the 4-year public (.007) and 2-year public (-.005) shares were not statistically significant.
21 As an additional robustness check, we re-estimated the program effect for public and private 4-year schools using an alternative control group comprised of SREB and midwestern states that would be largely unaffected by HOPE (enrolled fewer than 50 Georgia residents in 1992). The baseline estimates of δ obtained from this exercise are .050 and .019, respectively, both of which are statistically significant. While these results suggest a relatively stronger role for the scholarship at 4-year publics, the sum of theδs is .069, which matches the overall HOPE effect reported in Table 3 . The details of this alternative control-group analysis are available upon request.
Historically-Black Colleges
In Georgia, HBCUs comprise an important subset of the state's 4-year colleges and universities. There are eight such undergraduate institutions, enrolling almost a third of all black freshmen in the state during our sample period (e.g., 4889 of 14,985 in 1997). Their presence in Georgia likely reinforces for blacks the HOPE incentive to remain in state for their college educations. This is borne out when we compare changes in HBCU enrollment rates in Georgia with those in the SREB and border states; the results are reported in columns (7) and (8) of Table 3 . In the SREB case, the estimated HOPE effect is about 2.2 percentage points in the baseline regression and 2.5 when all of the covariates are included. As summarized in Table 8 , these estimates translate into a 38-44 percent higher HBCU enrollment rate in Georgia. When the border states are used as controls, we find smaller effects, but still about 2 percentage points. However, the size of these estimated program responses should be interpreted cautiously, as there is a greater concern in the HBCU case of spillovers from the treatment to control group. In particular, to the extent the HBCU enrollment rate rise is due the scholarship's incentive stay in state, the estimated HOPE effect is probably biased upward.
HOPE's influence on the HBCU enrollment rate could also reflect rising admission standards at the state's flagship universities. In contrast to the University of Georgia and Georgia Tech, in 1997 Barron's rated all but one Georgia HBCU as "less competitive," the fifth highest category. As their entrance requirements increased, the black share of freshmen enrollments at the University of Georgia and Georgia Tech fell from averages of 9.6 and 8 percent between 1990 and 1995 (the year the income cap was lifted) to 6.5 and 5.4 percent in 1996 (the year the value of the award rose to $3000 for students attending in-state private colleges). Since 1996 these shares remained below 6.5 at both schools, except during 1998 at Georgia Tech.
2-Year Public Colleges
Our ability to determine the scholarship's influence on 2-year school enrollments is hin-dered by the IPEDS's failure to distinguish degree from diploma and certificate seekers. We can, however, identify the less-than-2-year (technical) schools that do not offer degrees. Excluding them from the analysis removes the vast majority of grant recipients, allowing us to focus more narrowly on the effects of the scholarship. The results for degree-granting, 2-year publics are given in columns (9) and (10) of Table 3 .
Using the SREB controls, the baselineδ is .022 with a t-ratio of 1.54, but this falls to .011 with a much smaller t-ratio of .477 when the covariates are added. Although the estimated program effects are generally larger-about 3 percentage points-with the border states as the control group, neither has a t-ratio above one. So, there is no direct evidence of a statistically significant HOPE scholarship effect at 2-year schools. Nevertheless, it is still possible that enrollments at 2-year colleges have been affected by the scholarship. If movement along the 2-year-4-year margin explains some of the growth in the 4-year-school enrollment rate, then aδ of zero would imply that the seats "vacated" by students induced to pursue a 4-year degree were filled by individuals who would have otherwise entered the labor market. In the next section, we estimate out how much of the rise in 4-year enrollments can be separately accounted for by the relevant margins, and what effect the scholarship has had on 2-year school attendance.
Finally, to gauge the impact of the grant, we repeat the analysis, adding the enrollments from less-than-2-year schools that do not offer degrees. The findings from this exercise are presented in the last two columns of Table 3 . The estimated program effect increases in each case ranges from 2.5 to 4.4 percentage points. Although the t-ratios are less than 1.4 in all but the SREB baseline regression, the jump inδ when the non-degree-granting schools are included suggests the HOPE Grant has generated enrollment rate gains in diploma and certificate programs.
Stayers and Leavers
To summarize, when the income and wage covariates are included, the estimated HOPE effect on the overall first-time freshmen enrollment rate is 6.9 percentage points, virtually all of which is assigned to 4-year colleges and universities. Along what path does HOPE exert the greatest influence? Does the concentration of the program effect on 4-year schools reflect the scholarship's incentive to remain in state or its effect on the relative prices between 4-year and 2-year schools?
To sort this out, we examined the IPEDS residency and migration data. Every two years, the NCES collects information on the number of recent, first-time freshmen who enrolled in a college outside their state of residence (see the Appendix for details). Table   6 lists the twenty most popular out-of-state destinations for Georgia residents in 1992, and the enrollments of Georgians in those states from 1992 through 2000. The 1998 and 2000 observations lie outside our sample period because they are from an IPEDS early release.
Although we exclude early-release data from our formal enrollment-rate analysis, we appeal to them here because they suggest shifts in migration patterns that are the result of rising academic requirements at Georgia's most selective universities. Table 6 shows that between the fall of 1992, the year prior to HOPE's introduction, and the fall of 1994 (the year the income cap was raised from $66,000 to $100,00), the number of Georgia residents attending college out-of-state fell over 20 percent in the top-twenty destinations and 8 percent overall. Further, enrollments over this period at the top-five HBCUs-Florida A&M, Alabama State, Tuskegee University, Alabama A&M and Hampton University-dropped 34 percent, consistent with our finding of a strong HOPE effect on black enrollment rates at 4-year colleges in general, and on HBCU enrollment rates in particular.
While the pattern of decline continued at half of the institutions listed in Table 6 , total enrollments of Georgia residents in these schools and total out-migration changed little from 1994 to 1996.
How of much of our estimated total program effect is accounted for by the general pattern depicted in Table 6 through 1996? The NCES digest statistics on student migration make this difficult to answer in two ways. First, the digests provide only two pre-HOPE (1988 and 1992) and two post-HOPE (1994 and 1996) observations. Second, for the institution type most affected by migration decisions-the 4-year schools-only recent freshmen are tracked. HOPE-eligibles who delay entry into college past twelve months are excluded from this count.
Still, recent freshmen comprise about 80 percent of all freshmen in Georgia's 4-year colleges during these years. If the 4-year-school effect is primarily driven by the behavior of recent freshmen, an analysis of where they attend college should shed some light on the importance of the in-state-out-of-state margin. Therefore, we estimated DD regressions of recent freshmen residents attending college in state ("stayers"), non-resident enrollees ("outof-staters") and residents attending college in other states ("leavers"), utilizing the level specification indicated in Table 4 and the four available years of residence and migration data.
The data show that HOPE increased the number of stayers by 674 and out-of-staters by 346 and reduced the number of leavers by 497 students; each of these estimates is statistically significant. The sum of the stayer and out-of-stater estimates imply that HOPE raised recent freshmen enrollments in 4-year colleges by an average of 1020 students. The estimate of δ from the leaver regression suggests that almost 75 percent of the residential component can be attributed to the scholarship's incentive to remain in state.
The migration data can also used to estimate a HOPE effect for Georgia residents attending any 4-year college, albeit one limited to recent freshmen. Our estimate of this effect amounts to only 177 students, as should be evident from the combined stayer-leaver estimates, and is not statistically significant. Thus, at least for recent freshmen matriculating at 4-year schools, there is little evidence that HOPE increased the number of Georgians going to college. In contrast, Dynarski (2000) finds that HOPE raised the college attendance probability of Georgia-resident 18-19-year-olds by about 8 percentage points or 25 percent, based on data from the 1988-97 October CPS. However, college students in her sample are not necessarily recent freshmen at 4-year schools. At the same time, because the CPS do not distinguish institution type, they cannot be used to isolate the effects of the merit-based scholarship, which we show are concentrated in 4-year schools.
HOPE's influence on the interstate migration margin is not captured entirely by the drop in the number of leavers; the composition of leavers has also changed. Consider Figure 6 which plots the SAT series for freshmen enrolled in Georgia colleges and universities, along with those of high-school seniors in Georgia and the rest of the US. The increases in SAT scores among Georgia freshmen stand out, rising almost 40 points after the HOPE program was started, while the scores of high-school seniors rose more modestly. Since 1993 Georgia's rate of retaining students with SAT scores greater than 1500 has climbed from 23 to 76 percent.
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The single most important contributor to the rise in Georgia freshmen SATs has been the University of Georgia (Sridhar (2001)). As we described above, the university now has "highly competitive" Barron's ranking, up from merely "competitive" in the late 1980s.
Thus, it is not surprising to find in Table 6 Table 4 , but restricting the sample to the 1988, 92, 94 and 96 observations (corresponding to years the migration data is available), produces aδ of 3108. The data on recent freshmen account for only 1020, or one-third, of this total. Unfortunately, the NCES Digests do not provide the same migration information for all freshmen in 4-year schools, so we are unable to make any clear inferences about the behavior of the other 2000 students. Nevertheless, we suppose that the incentive to remain in state is less important for late matriculators than recent freshmen; delayed entry is probably more likely among those on the college-going or 2-year-4-year margins. If so, our recent and all-freshmen findings indicate that the greater share of the overall enrollment effect can be traced to HOPE's reduction of the 4-year-2-year relative price.
Enrollments by Race
Next, we decompose the total and institution-specific HOPE effects by race. Since the NCES has reported recent high-school-graduate data by race only since 1992, we now define the college-eligible population in terms of 18-19-year-olds. Table 7 presents the estimated HOPE effects for all, white and black first-time freshmen by institution type obtained from the specification that includes all of the covariates. Note that the racial breakdown of freshmen for 1989 is missing in the NCES data. Tables 3 are supported by the estimates of δ in the "All" column of Table 7 . Using 18-19-year-olds as the college-eligible population, we obtain highly significantδs of .0090 and .0070 for 4-year public and private institutions. The estimated HOPE effect for 2-year colleges is now negative, albeit small and with a t-ratio of only -.13. Interestingly, when the non-degree-granting schools are added to the sample,δ rises to .0089 and its t-ratio to 1.5. This finding points to the influence of the grant, and as we discuss below, particularly among blacks.
First, the broad qualitative and quantitative findings in
Due to the scale of E it when 18-19-year-olds is the denominator, theseδs are smaller than those reported earlier, but they translate into percentage increases in enrollment rates of similar magnitudes. These estimates suggest HOPE-induced overall enrollment rate increases in 4-year public (private) institutions of about 9 (16) percent, compared with 12 (20) percent when E it is based on recent high-school graduates. The race-specific estimates of δ and their implied percentage changes in the enrollment rate are summarized in Table 8 along with those from the specifications in Table 3 that hold income and wages constant. The robustness of our results across eligible populations is consistent with our findings that HOPE has not affected high-school graduation rates and controlling for the size of the 18-19-year-old population does not matter.
Second, the results for whites and blacks generally replicate the pattern seen in the "All" column, with HOPE's influence being largely confined to 4-year schools. The estimated HOPE effect is 1.7 (.50) percentage points for blacks (whites) attending 4-year public colleges, which translates into a 27 (5) percent rise in the black (white) enrollment rate. The differential impact of the scholarship is smaller in 4-year private institutions, where the black (white) estimate of δ is .82 (.34) percentage points implies enrollment rate increases of 14 (9) percent.
An exception to the "All" pattern is black 2-year-college enrollments. Including the nondegree-granting institutions in the analysis leads to an estimated effect of .015 with a t-ratio of 5.1, or about a 22 percent increase in the overall 2-year-school enrollment rate for blacks. This is strong evidence that the HOPE Grant has increased black participation in diploma and certificate programs. Nevertheless, the policy response is somewhat surprising, since the typical enrollee in these non-degree schools' program offerings is eligible for Pell assistance.
One possible explanation for the significant and sizeable HOPE effect is the transactions costs associated with the grant. To receive Pell, a student must complete the Free Application then a second time, dropping states with shares less than 25 percent. In both cases, the qualitative pattern, relative precision and implied percentage changes in the enrollment rate of the estimated δs remained essentially the same.
Conclusions
Historically, financial aid for post-secondary schooling has been directed at removing financial barriers that prevent needy individuals from attending college. However, since the late 1980s, the fraction of total aid tied to merit has risen, a trend that has been accelerated by the creation of numerous state-sponsored, merit-based scholarships modelled after Georgia's HOPE program. Introduced in 1993, Georgia's HOPE Scholarship is by far the largest such program, covering tuition, fees, and book expenses for all eligible high-school graduates attending Georgia public post-secondary institutions, and providing students attending instate private institutions a subsidy comparable in value to that received by public-school enrollees, without any income restrictions. To qualify, a student must have graduated from an eligible high school since 1993 with a "B" average.
In this paper, we have examined the HOPE Scholarship's effects on college attendance in Georgia. Treating the program as a natural experiment, we contrasted enrollment rates in Georgia with those in the other member states of the SREB using IPEDS data covering the period 1988-97. Our findings can be summarized as follows.
First, HOPE has raised the first-time-freshmen enrollment rate in Georgia about 6.9 percentage points, or 9 percent, relative to the rest of the SREB. Second, the overall HOPE effect is split between public and private 4-year colleges, while the coefficient estimate for 2-year schools is small and statistically insignificant. The 4-year results imply scholarship-induced enrollment rate increases of roughly 12 (20) percent at public (private) colleges. Taking the estimated 2-year HOPE effect to be zero leads to the conclusion that seats vacated by students pursuing 4-year degrees were filled by individuals who would have otherwise entered the labor market. However, most new 2-year-school enrollees were more likely beneficiaries of the HOPE Grant, which has no merit requirements and applies exclusively to non-degree programs.
Third, this pattern is generally replicated when we disaggregate our analysis by race.
For both blacks and whites, HOPE's influence is largely confined to 4-year schools, with the greater percentage increases for blacks in public institutions. Specifically, we find black enrollment rates at 4-year public (private) colleges are 27 (14) percent higher because of HOPE. Part of the explanation is that blacks have much lower enrollment rates to begin with; therefore, a relatively small increase in enrollment rates can account for a large percentage change. Further, Georgia is home to a number of historically black colleges and universities (HBCUs), providing an added incentive for African Americans to attend an in-state 4-year college. The data indicate a substantial policy effect for these institutions.
Fourth, using the four available years of IPEDS student residence and migration data, we estimate that about 75 percent of the HOPE effect on recent freshmen enrollments at 4-year schools can be attributed to the scholarship's incentive to remain in state. However, the recent-freshmen program effect accounts for only one-third, of the total enrollment response at 4-year schools. The remainder reflects the behavior of late matriculators, who, by virtue of their delayed entry, we suppose are more likely to be on the college-going or 2-year-4-year margins. Unfortunately, the residence and migration information is generally limited to recent freshmen, so it is not possible to infer much from the data about the movements of late matriculators. In any case, our combined recent and all-freshmen findings point to the conclusion that HOPE's reduction of the 4-year-2-year relative price accounts for a substantial share of the overall HOPE effect.
Finally, our results suggest that the HOPE program increased the total number of firsttime freshmen in Georgia colleges, relative to their SREB counterparts, by roughly 4100 per year between 1993 and 1997. This represents about 12 percent of high-school graduates who qualified for the scholarship during these five years and 21 percent of those who took the award. However, the overall program response involves enrollees at 2-year schools, who are more likely recipients of the non-merit-based grant, and there were at least as many of these individuals as HOPE Scholars over the period. Thus, the HOPE-induced enrollment increase amounts to less than 10 percent of all first-year program beneficiaries. These findings suggest that the HOPE program has operated largely as a transfer to students who would have enrolled in college anyway, although its relative price effects have influenced where students attend.
Appendix: IPEDS Enrollment Data
Our enrollment data are drawn from annual IPEDS surveys conducted by the NCES, which cover all Title IV postsecondary institutions. IPEDS launched in 1986, but the first two surveys are not comparable to those from 1988 onward. A consistent and reliable series of surveys were available through 1997, so we restrict our sample period to 1988-97. Earlyrelease data exist for 1998, but we do not include them in our formal analysis since they have not met the usual NCES reliability standards, especially for state-level measures.
Institution Types
IPEDS data are collected and reported at the institution level, and schools are classified by level (4-year, 2-year or other) and control (public or private). For our purposes, we established the following institution groups and aggregated the enrollment data accordingly: all degree-granting, 4-year public, 4-year private (for-profit and nonprofit), 2-year public and less-than-2-year public. The distinction between 2-year and less-than-2-year schools is that the former offer associate degrees and the latter only offer certificate programs which take less than two years to complete. In Georgia, however, 13 in the 2-year category are "technical" schools affiliated with the state's Department of Technical and Adult Education (DTAE) and accredited to offer degrees, so they have both kinds of programs. Thus, 20 DTAE institutions can be classified as less-than-2-year or purely technical. Unfortunately, it is not possible to separate degree from certificate-seekers in the 2-yearschool enrollment data. The implication of this is that our estimates of HOPE's effect on the overall and 2-year-school enrollment rates conflate the influences of the scholarship and grant. To gauge the grant's impact, we estimate the 2-year-school program effect with and without the less-than-2-year institutions in the sample.
First-time vs Recent Freshmen
IPEDS also makes the distinction between "first-time" and "recent" freshmen. Recent freshmen are those who have graduated from high school within the previous 12 months. Because these corrections do not substantially change the average overall or public, 4-year post-HOPE enrollment rates, they alter our results only very slightly. In any case, the details of the corrections are available upon request. 
a In millions of dollars.
b Of the 34 technical schools that are HOPE-eligible, 13 offer associate's degrees and therefore can award both the Scholarship and Grant.
c These and private 2-year schools were eligible to participate only from 1996.
d A few public, 4-year and 2-year institutions also offer technical certificates and diplomas. a Heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent t-ratios in parentheses.
b This specification replicates column (2) from Table 3 and includes state and year effects, income and wage covariates.
c Enrollment rates are defined over the number of (all, white, black) 18-19-yearolds in the current year. Numerator is the number of first-time freshmen, full and part-time, from each institution type. a Results presented are from the column (2) specification with state and year effects and all covariates and with the SREB states as the control group. Only estimates that are statistically significant at the 10 percent level against a 2-tailed test are reported.
b E it is defined using current high-school graduates as the eligible population.
c E it is defined using 18-19-year-olds as the eligible population. 
